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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, in his
private and individual capacity, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated
RYAN S. WALTERS,
MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL and
RICHARD A. CONRAD, ET AL., on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

NO.2:10-cv-76

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the United
States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official
capacity as the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F.
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of the United States Department
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor

DEFENDANTS

SECOND AMENDED PETITION
FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
COME NOW the Petitioners, Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his private and individual
capacity, Ryan S. Walters, Michael E. Shot well, Richard A. Conrad and others named herein, by
and through their attorneys, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and allege
based on personal knowledge all matters pertaining to themselves and upon information and
belief as to all other matters, as follows hereinafter.
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NATURE OF THE AMENDMENT.
1.

This Court on February 2, 2011 filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [13]. The Court held that “the ten primary Plaintiffs have not plead sufficient
facts to establish that they have standing to challenge the Constitutionality of the minimum
essential coverage provision of the PPACA,” and further held that “it is generally appropriate to
permit plaintiffs an opportunity to correct jurisdictional defects in their complaint.” The Court
therefore ordered that “if Plaintiffs so desire, they may file a Second Amended Petition within
thirty (30) days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.”
2.
Each and every Petitioner herein earnestly desires an adjudication of their claims, and
therefore file this, their Second Amended Petition, in conformance with the Court’s Order [26] of
February 2, 2011.
A.

SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONERS'
STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE.
3.
Petitioners each specifically allege that they have been currently injured by the passage of

the PPACA and the Individual Mandate, despite the mandate's future effective date.

The

Individual Mandate currently is enacted into law, and is a current dictate to perform an act in the
future, which therefore currently robs Petitioners of the blessings of liberty. Enforcement of the
PPACA's Individual Mandate is definitively fixed in time and impending, and Petitioners
specifically aver that there is a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the
statute's operation or enforcement that is reasonably pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time
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and which is not merely hypothetical or conjectural; that time is the year 2014, when the
Individual Mandate begins implementation.
4.
The American people have a written guarantee known as the Constitution of the United
States of America that we will live under a government of the people, by the people, and for the
people. The Constitution itself states that its purpose is to ensure the blessings of liberty to all
Americans. However, despite the guarantees of individual liberty and collective freedom from
governmental oppression found in the Constitution, Petitioners currently live in oppressive fear
of the actions that their own elected federal government will take against them when they fail to
comply with the unjust and immoral mandate that they enter into a contract with a private
company for the purchase of health insurance.
5.
Petitioners each allege that they have no intention whatsoever of complying with the
Individual Mandate or of purchasing health insurance now or in the future. Petitioners also each
allege that there is no possible change of circumstances that might lead them to voluntarily
comply with the Individual Mandate. Any such change of circumstances proposed by the
Defendants would at best be purely speculative and hypothetical. For Petitioners, the idea that
the federal government could force them to purchase health insurance is morally and
ideologically repugnant as well as contrary to their American values of limited government, and
each individual Petitioner will conscientiously resist the dictate of the PPACA to enter into a
contract to purchase health insurance. Moreover, as Petitioners have previously set forth, they
each desire to maintain their medical privacy, and as set forth herein, the Individual Mandate
constitutes a serious governmental abrogation of the ancient right to medical privacy.
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6.
Petitioners herein each specifically allege that they have already begun to take steps to
prepare for the implementation of the PPACA, that they are presently having to deviate from
their previously set plans in response to the PPACA. Each Petitioner specifically avers that he
would not purchase health insurance in 2014 but for the requirements of the Act, and each
further specifically avers that he intends to disobey the PPACA by failing to purchase health
insurance despite the Individual Mandate.
7.
Petitioner specifically aver that there are present detrimental effects upon each Petitioner
due to the PPACA. The Individual Mandate begins implementation on January 1, 2014, but
Petitioners specifically aver that it has already begun to take effect, since it has affected each
Petitioner in concrete and adverse ways. Each Petitioner specifically avers that he is currently
arranging his financial affairs differently than he otherwise would in order to prepare for the
January 1, 2014 implementation of the Individual Mandate. Each Petitioner further specifically
avers that he is making decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he will have the funds
to pay for the penalties associated with his noncompliance and the associated legal costs of
defending himself for his noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins implementation
on January 1, 2014. Each Petitioner specifically avers that the impending enforcement of the
Individual Mandate has forced them to make significant and costly changes in their personal
financial planning, necessitating significant lifestyle changes and extensive reorganization of
their personal and financial affairs.
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8.
Each Petitioner specifically alleges that the loss of their medical privacy and the
economic consequences to them of either purchasing insurance or paying for the penalties and
legal costs of defending themselves for their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate are not
just possible future injuries, but are certainly impending injuries. Petitioners each seek to avoid
the certain consummation of these injuries by obtaining preventive relief through this lawsuit.
Moreover, each Petitioner further specifically avers the certainly impending implementation of
the Individual Mandate causes them to currently experience fear, anxiety and emotional distress
over their loss of medical privacy, their loss of individual freedom of choice, and the economic
consequences to them of either purchasing insurance or paying for the penalties and legal costs
of defending themselves for their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate. Petitioners
further specifically allege that each of these allegations is capable of proof at the trial that
Petitioners seek.
9.
Petitioners each specifically allege that the law will certainly be enforced on each of
them. Each Petitioner specifically alleges that they are “applicable individuals” who must
comply with the minimum coverage provision. 26 USC § 5000A(d)(1). Petitioners more
specifically factually allege that they are not incarcerated individuals, see 26 USC §
5000A(d)(4), and that they are citizens of the United States, see 26 USC § 5000A(d)(3).
10.
Each Petitioner further specifically alleges that they do not meet the requirements for the
“Religious exemption” definition found in 26 USC § 5000A(d)(2). Petitioners each allege that
they are not members of “a recognized religious sect or division thereof described in section
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1402(g)(1) and an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division as
described in such section.” Each Petitioner specifically and explicitly alleges that they are not
members of a recognized religious sect or division thereof or an adherent of established tenets or
teachings of such sect or division by reason of which they would be conscientiously opposed to
acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in the event
of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or that makes payments toward the cost of, or that
provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by
the Social Security Act).

Nor are Petitioners part of any health-sharing ministries

for individuals sharing “a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expenses
among members in accordance with those beliefs.”
11.
Each Petitioner also specifically alleges that their incomes are now and certainly in the
future will be above the filing threshold. 26 USC § 5000A. Petitioners further specifically
allege that are not “Individuals who cannot afford coverage,” as that term is used in 26 USC §
5000A(e)(1). Petitioners specifically allege that their required contribution (determined on an
annual basis) for coverage for any month does not now and will not in the future exceed 8
percent of such individual’s household income for the taxable year described in section
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Petitioners specifically allege
that each individual Petitioner’s household income for the taxable year described in section
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is not less than 100 percent of
the poverty line for the size of the family involved (determined in the same manner as under
subsection (b)(4)); see 26 USC § 5000A(e)(1).
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12.
Petitioners specifically allege that they are not members of any Indian tribes as set forth
under 26 USC § 5000A (e)(4). Petitioners specifically allege that they have not been determined
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a
hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan. Each
Petitioner specifically alleges that he is above the age of eighteen.
13.
Petitioner Lt. Governor Phil Bryant specifically pleads that he is an elected official of the
State of Mississippi, and as such is employed by the State of Mississippi for a term certain,
which is set to end prior to the date when enforcement of the Individual Mandate begins.
Whether or not Lt. Governor Bryant remains an elected official or employee of the State of
Mississippi, however, is a moot point, since he will be subject to the Individual Mandate either
way. Petitioner Bryant specifically re-alleges the facts alleged in paragraphs 1-10 supra, and is
intent on remaining a petitioner in this matter in his individual capacity.
14.
Petitioners further state as a cause of action that the religious exemption of the PPACA is
in itself unconstitutional since it discriminates against different religious faiths by allowing
followers of one faith who otherwise would be subject to the Individual Mandate to not comply
with the mandate or be subject to any penalties for such noncompliance, while followers of other
faiths (like the religious faiths of Petitioners) are subject to the Individual Mandate and to
penalties for noncompliance.
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SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONERS'
STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR CLAIMS REGARDING THE DEPRIVATION
CAUSED BY THE PPACA OF THIR FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO MEDICAL PRIVACY.
15.
The PPACA is an overbearing federal mandate that violates the right of Petitioners to

choose their own health care. Moreover, each and every Petitioner has heretofore plead a cause
of action based upon their constitutional right to medical privacy which has been infringed by the
PPACA. Petitioners all specifically allege that they will be required to divulge confidential
medical information to insurance companies if they enter into a health insurance contract as a
result of the Individual Mandate. The Petitioners who do not currently have health insurance
specifically allege that they do not wish to divulge their confidential medical information to any
insurance company and would for this reason alone bring this action to contest the
constitutionality of the PPACA and the Individual Mandate.
16.
Petitioner Bryant specifically alleges that he has no intention of ever divulging
confidential medical information to any insurance company that he is forced to contract with due
to the PPACA and the Individual Mandate. Petitioner Bryant specifically alleges that he is being
coerced by an overbearing federal government to comply with the Individual Mandate, and that
he is being coerced into divulging confidential medical information to insurance companies.
Petitioner Bryant and all other Petitioners therefore are specifically contesting the deprivation of
their fundamental constitutional right to medical privacy.
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PARTIES
PETITIONERS
17.

Ryan S. Walters is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner
class in this action.
18.
Michael E. Shot well is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Ellisville,
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner
class in this action.
19.
Richard A. Conrad is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
20.
Diane Perdue is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
21.
Elizabeth Sullivan is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel ,Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
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22.
William M. Carmichael, Jr. is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel,
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner
class in this action.
23.
Tonya Nobles is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
24.
Eddie Nobles is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Laurel, Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
25.
Mary Kruppe is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Picayune, Mississippi
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this
action.
26.
Lisa Stewart is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Purvis, Mississippi within
the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner class in this action.
27.
Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant is a citizen of the State of Mississippi, residing in Rankin County,
Mississippi within the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner is a representative of the Petitioner
class or sub-class in this action.

- 10 -

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 27

Filed 03/04/11 Page 11 of 46

B. DEFENDANTS
28.
Eric H. Holder, Jr. is currently the Attorney General of the United States. In his official
capacity, the Attorney General is the chief federal official responsible for the enforcement of all
federal statutes in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America.
29.
United States Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) is an agency of the
United States and is responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA, through its
center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
30.
Kathleen Sebelius is Secretary of HHS and is named as a party in her official capacity.
31.
United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) is an agency of the United States
and is responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA.
32.
Timothy F. Geithner is Secretary of the Treasury and is named as a party in his official
capacity.
33.
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) is an agency of the United States and is
responsible for administration and enforcement of the PPACA.
34.
Hilda L. Solis is Secretary of DOL and is named as a party in her official capacity.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
35.

This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the United
States. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8912; 28U.S.C. § 1331;
and 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
36.
Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and 28 U.S.C.§
1402(a)(1) because Petitioners reside in this district and the events giving rise to these claims
arose in this district.

IV.

NATURE OF ACTION
37.

This is an individual action and a statewide class action for declaratory and injunctive
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 57 and for review of agency
action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. It seeks a determination that certain provisions of the
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” H.R. 3590 (“the PPACA”),as applied to
Petitioners, violate the United States Constitution by mandating American citizens to purchase
health insurance, since the government does not have the authority to require citizens to buy any
good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States. Indeed, a mandate to
enter into a contract with an insurance company would be the first use of the Commerce Clause
to universally mandate an activity by all citizens of the United States. If this legal precedent is
established, Congress would have the unlimited power to regulate, prohibit, or mandate any or
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all activities in the United States. Such a doctrine would abolish any limit on federal power and
alter the fundamental relationship of the national government to the states and the people.
38.
On March 23, 2010, a new universal healthcare regime, titled the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act,” was signed into law by President Barack Obama.
39.
The PPACA represents an unprecedented encroachment on the liberty of individuals by
mandating, inter alia, that all citizens and legal residents of the United States have qualifying
healthcare coverage or pay a penalty. By imposing such a mandate, the PPACA exceeds the
powers of the United States Government under Article I of the Constitution and violates the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
40.
In addition, the tax penalty required under the PPACA, which must be paid by uninsured
citizens and residents, constitutes an unlawful capitation or direct tax, in violation of Article I,
sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the United States.
41.
Defendants are seriously intent on enforcing the challenged statutory Individual Mandate
found and described in Count I of the petition.
42.
Petitioners and all others similarly situated are directly subject to the PPACA’s Individual
Mandate because they do not possess any form of health insurance and are, as such, classified as
uninsured. Moreover, Petitioners do not desire and have no intention to obey what they consider
to be an unconstitutional Individual Mandate found and described in Count I of the petition.
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43.
The Individual Mandate’s future effective date, which is definite, does not deprive
Petitioners of standing or violate the requirement of ripeness since there are threatened injuries to
Petitioners of having to plan for, invest, save and exhaust the personal resources required as a
result of incurring the impending expense of purchasing healthcare insurance or, in the
alternative, to pay a significant monetary penalty for disobeying the PPACA. Since Petitioners
allege direct economic harm from the PPACA’s impending mandate, standing to assert their
claims clearly exists. See, e.g., Ok pal obi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir.1999). For the
purpose of Petitioners’ Constitutional challenge to the PPACA’s certainaly impending Individual
Mandate, there need be no detailed factual development because the questions presented are
purely legal. Petitioners simply desire an adjudication of their rights, duties and obligations
under the PPACA before their injuries are fully and finally consummated. Since Petitioners have
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct affected with a constitutional interest, but
proscribed by the PPACA, and there exists a credible threat of penalty thereunder, they should
not be required to await and undergo punishment as the sole means of seeking relief. See, e.g.,
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S.289 (1979). The Constitutional violations
about which Petitioners complain will clearly bare dressed by a favorable decision of the court.
44.
The concrete and future threat of injuries and burdens of complying with or being
punished by the PPACA’s regulatory scheme and Individual Mandate are presently causing
actual and well-founded worry, fear and anguish on the part of Petitioners.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
45.

It is axiomatic that “our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between
the states and the federal Government.” See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). The
Supreme Court recognized and affirmed this fundamental principle from the earliest days of the
Republic, as Chief Justice Marshall famously observed: “The powers of the legislature are
defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.” Mar bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 176 (1803).
46.
Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions, and
not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly. In fact, the concept
of state sovereignty is implicit in the Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all
governmental powers, but only the few, discrete and enumerated ones contained in Article I,
Section 8.
47.
It is an implication rendered express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Tenth Amendment affirms the
undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the federal government is one of enumerated,
hence limited, powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 (Wheat.) 316, 405(1819) (“This
government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers”). Stated another way,
“[t]he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The
Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
- 15 -
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48.
The structure of the Constitution reflects the federalist values of the document’s framers
and is inconsistent with any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would grant Congress
unlimited power. The Constitution’s framers constrained Congress’s power to specific
enumerated powers to guard against undue expansion of federal power. Likewise ,the framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the states and
instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent
authority over the people, who were, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “the only proper objects of
government.”
49.
Accordingly, the federal government may act only where the Constitution authorizes it to
do so. See, e.g., New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Founder James Madison
emphasized the importance of limiting the lawmaking powers of the federal government in the
Federalist Papers: “In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to
be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to
certain enumerated objects.” The Federalist No. 14, at 97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
50.
By establishing a system of dual sovereignty and limited federal power, the framers
sought to diffuse the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority in order to protect the people
from tyranny. As the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Gregory, “[t]he Constitutionally
mandated balance of power’ between the states and the federal government was adopted by the
framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’” 501 U.S.at 458 (quoting

- 16 -

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 27

Filed 03/04/11 Page 17 of 46

Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”). Thus, by dividing power between
the states and the federal government, our Constitution “reduce[s] the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.” Gregory, 501 U.S.at 458.
51.
For this check against tyranny to work, however, there must be a healthy balance of
power between the states and the federal government. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
52.
The great innovation of the Constitution’s design was that “our citizens would have two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.” It has
been properly described as “a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53.
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of the federal
government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The
result may appear “formalistic” in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such
measures are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity. But the Constitution “protects
us from our own best intentions by dividing power among sovereigns and among branches of
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government precisely so that the majority may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.” New York, 505 U.S. at 187. Indeed,
“[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of
liberty.” Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (emphasis added).
54.
Congress’s power is not absolute; therefore, authority to enact the Individual Mandate
must be found in one of its enumerated powers to be constitutionally valid. In the case sub
judice, Congress has specifically crafted legislation that invokes the Commerce Clause as
constitutional authority for Congress to impose the PPACA’s mandates. However, adopting the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause suggested by Congress would forever eliminate
aforementioned safeguards inherent in the Constitution, thereby making federal power unlimited.
An ambitious Congress should not be allowed, under the guise of regulating commerce, to
destroy the federalist structure created by the Constitution’s founders. As Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, “[w]ere the
federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas
having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory.” Lopez, 514 U. S. at 578 (1995).
55.
Since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Congress has continued to
usurp additional powers by pretending the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. It now
considers the Commerce Clause the equivalent of a general regulatory power. Until the Court
replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the
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original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under
the guise of regulating commerce.
56.
The immense power now claimed by Congress and the current administration does not
comport with either the text or purpose of the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Constitution
gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. It does not give Congress the power
to regulate commerce and anything and everything having an effect thereon.
57.
In its application to domestic affairs, the Commerce Clause was written primarily to
ensure the free flow of goods and services among the states and to preclude states from
interfering with that commerce. While Congress’s power to regulate activity under the
Commerce Clause is without question very broad, it is not unlimited. See, e.g., Wicker v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). When Congress legislates at what are, at best, the outer limits
of its commerce power, meaningful judicial review of whether that exercise is within Congress’s
delegated powers is essential if our federal system is to be preserved.
58.
The inquiry into the meaning of the Commerce Clause begins with the text. See Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (where language of Constitution is clear, and unambiguous it
must be given its plain evident meaning). The meaning of the term “commerce” is already
settled. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court explained that “commerce” encompasses more
than simply traffic in commodities; it encompasses “intercourse.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90
(1824). In other words, the term applies to the instrumentalities of commerce used to carry
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commodities from one place to another. The Gibbons definition of commerce is consistent with
both the views of the founders and of the ordinary meaning of the term “commerce” at the time
of the Constitution’s drafting. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (1987).
59.
Importantly, the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and with Indian tribes. Any activity that affects commerce of one
category in some attenuated way would necessarily affect the other two categories. This result
renders the separately enumerated categories redundant. The broad and expansive interpretation
urged by the United States Government, therefore, contradicts the principle that “The Commerce
Clause draws a clear distinction between ‘States’ and ‘Indian tribes.”’ See Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989); see Epstein, supra, at 1393-94.
Significantly, every activity affects commerce in some insignificant way. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at
1362. Had the Founders intended the commerce power to be unlimited, enumerating three
categories of commerce for Congress to regulate would have been wholly unnecessary. See
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
60.
For Congress to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause, the activity itself must be
commercial. As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in Lopez, “the power to regulate
‘commerce’ can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession, anymore than it
empowers the federal government to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals,
throughout the 50 states. Our Constitution quite properly leaves such matters to the individual
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states, notwithstanding these activities’ effects on interstate commerce.” Lopez,514 U.S. at 585
(Thomas, J., concurring).
61.
To empower the PPACA pursuant to Congress’s broad interpretation of the Commerce
Clause would render other constitutional provisions completely meaningless. Extending the
Commerce Clause to reach any matter that affects commerce renders thee numerated powers
nugatory. Indeed, the enumerated powers are all superfluous and without real effect if the
commerce power extends to any matter that has any effect upon commerce. Such an
interpretation would violate the traditional rule that the Constitution should not be interpreted to
render other portions of the Constitution meaningless. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
62.
While an offense may be created and “punished by Congress, under its general authority
to make all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers,” United
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838), Congress may criminalize or make unlawful
certain activity (not inactivity) under the necessary and proper clause only when it is pursuing an
end which is clearly within its enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 423 (1819); see also Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 75. In other words, Congress may
regulate a local activity only if its purpose comports with its delegated power to regulate
commerce and the regulation is plainly adapted to its interstate commerce purpose.
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63.
The Supreme Court has also made clear that Congress cannot exercise authority not
granted to it under the pretext of exercising its enumerated powers. See McCulloch, 17 U.S.(4
Wheat.) at 423.
64.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the mere fact that Congress has said when a
particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by
this Court.” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); see also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
65.
As such, the Court should not assume that facts exist to support Congressional action in
regards to the PPACA. While courts properly assume a state of facts when assessing the
rationality of legislative means, see FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993),this is
because the necessary and proper clause grants Congress broad discretion to enact “all means
which are appropriate, [and] which are plainly adapted to” a legitimate end. See McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. But it does not extend to the question of the validity of the end itself. The
extreme and unwarranted deference on the question of legislative end surged by Congress is
antithetical to a constitutional system which “created a federal Government of limited powers.”
See Gregory, 501 U.S. 452 at 457.
66.
Though some deference is certainly due Congress, if that were tantamount to treating
Congress as the sole judge of the limits on its constitutional authority, no judicial review would
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be needed or even possible, and the principle of enumerated powers would amount to an empty
promise. The doctrine of deference has not yet rendered judicial review superfluous.

67.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress’s power to declare activity unlawful under the
Commerce Clause is limited by the scope of that power. Although the Supreme Court has
sanctioned a broad use of the commerce power, its decisions nonetheless make clear that the
Commerce Clause has real and substantial limits. Were it otherwise, it would be meaningless to
speak of a “federal government of limited powers.” See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.
68.
The “substantial economic effect” Commerce Clause cases since Jones & Laughlin Steel
consistently refer to “activities.” See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37(“intrastate
activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal
control”); Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (“those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end”); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy,
315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (“intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or
obstruct the exercise of the granted power”); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (“even if apple’s activity
be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); Perez,
402 U.S. at 150 (“activities affecting commerce”); Lopez, 514U.S. at 558 (“three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power”); Morrison, 529
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U.S. at 698 (“three broad categories of activity”) (quoting Lopez); Raich, 545 U.S. at 17
(“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”). Consequently, in order to render
conduct unlawful under the Commerce Clause, Congress must be regulating interstate
commerce, not merely inactivity. Congress cannot, under the guise of regulating interstate
commerce, legislate beyond its delegated authority. And Congress’s regulation of intrastate
activity must reach activity that has a real and “substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.” See Perez, 402 U.S. at 152 (quoting Wickard, 317U.S. at 125). The Individual
Mandate to purchase insurance, discussed infra, goes well beyond the bounds of the Commerce
Clause.
VI.

COUNT ONE

INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
69.
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though
fully set forth herein.
70.
Most American citizens, including Petitioners, will be required to be insured or, in the
alternative, pay a fine. The mandate takes effect on January 1, 2014. This “personal
responsibility” provision of the legislation is more accurately known as the “Individual Mandate”
because it commands all individuals to enter into a contractual relationship with a private
insurance company. Surprisingly, an Individual Mandate to buy health insurance has been a
component of most health care reform plans proposed over the years. Based on the premise that
if everyone had health insurance, it is argued that health care costs would be spread equally
among everyone, and the individual cost for health insurance would be reduced.

- 24 -

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 27

Filed 03/04/11 Page 25 of 46

71.
Some in Congress have contended that the Individual Mandate rationale is similar to the
policy justification for requiring all drivers to maintain automobile liability insurance as a prerequisite to maintaining a drivers’ license. But such an analogy is tenuous and stretches the
bounds of common sense, at best. The purpose of state auto insurance mandates is to provide
financial protection for others that an insured driver may harm, and not necessarily for the driver
himself. Moreover, an auto insurance mandate is a conditional exchange for having a state issue
the privilege of a driver’s license. Simply put, a person is not mandated to have a driver’s license
or automobile insurance unless he wishes to drive his automobile on public roads. Even more
importantly from a Constitutional standpoint, state requirements differ from federal requirements
since Congress does not possess a general police power, unlike the states.
72.
Under the PPACA, those without qualifying health insurance coverage will be subject to
an Individual Mandate requiring the purchase of coverage from a private insurance company. If
the mandate is not followed, then those without qualifying health insurance will be subject to
what the PPACA expressly describes as a “penalty.” The penalty will be phased in according to
the following schedule: $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016 for the flat fee or 1.0% of
taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016.
Beginning in 2016, the penalty will be increased annually by a cost-of-living adjustment, making
it more progressive.
73.
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) acknowledged the unprecedented nature of an
Individual Mandate when assessing the Clinton health care reform proposal of 1993: “A mandate
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requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal
action. The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of
lawful residence in the United States. An Individual Mandate has two features that, in
combination, make it unique. First, it would impose a duty on individuals as members of society.
Second, it would require people to purchase a specific service that would have to be heavily
regulated by the federal government.” The CBO likewise observed that the only analogous
mandate on individual behavior from the federal government on this level would be the
registration provisions under the Selective Service Act. The authority to impose a selective
service system and military draft, however, is founded under the Congressional Article I power
to raise and support armies, not under the Commerce Clause utilized by Congress this case. See
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/
doc38.pdf.

74.
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), an entity that traditionally expresses the
most permissive view of Congressional Article I powers, when asked by the Senate Finance
Committee to opine on whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose an Individual
Mandate of this nature, expressed an uncertain position, noting that “whether such a requirement
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question
posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require
an individual to purchase a good or a service.” Stamen & Brougher, Requiring, Individuals to
Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis (2009) http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R40725_20090724.pdf (discussed infra).
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75.
The purpose of Congress’s compulsory Individual Mandate, coupled with arbitrary price
ratios and controls, is to require persons to buy artificially high-priced policies to subsidize
coverage for others as well as an industry overly burdened with other government costs and
regulations. Revenues paid by conscripted citizens to the insurance companies are needed to
compensate for the increased costs imposed upon these companies and the healthcare industry by
the myriad regulations of the PPACA.
76.
An Individual Mandate to enter into a contract with or buy a particular product from a
private party, with penalties to enforce it, is unprecedented not just in scope but in kind. It is also
unconstitutional as a matter of first principles and under any reasonable reading of judicial
precedents.
77.
Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given the power to mandate that an individual
enter into a contract with a private party or purchase a good or service. There is simply no
legislative or judicial precedent for this claim of congressional power. Because this claim of
power by Congress would literally be without precedent, it could only be upheld if the Supreme
Court is willing to create a new constitutional doctrine.
78.
In the last seventy years, the Supreme Court has applied a relatively straightforward
judicial test to determine whether a federal statute is within the commerce power of Congress.
When evaluating a claim of power under the Commerce Clause, the Court proceeds with a twopronged inquiry. First, the Court determines whether the entire class of regulated activity is
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within Congress’s constitutional reach; and second, whether the petitioner is a member of that
class.
79.
A long line of Supreme Court cases establishes that Congress may regulate three
categories of activity pursuant to the commerce power. These categories were first summarized
in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and most recently reaffirmed in Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). First, Congress may regulate the “channels of interstate or foreign
commerce” such as the regulation of steamship, railroad, highway, or aircraft transportation or
prevent them from being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons
who have been kidnapped. Second, the commerce power extends to protecting “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or
persons or things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments.” Third,
Congress may regulate economic activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce.”
80.
Under the first prong of its Commerce Clause analysis, the Supreme Court asks whether
the class of activities regulated by the statute falls within one or more of these categories. Since
an individual health insurance mandate is not even arguably a regulation of a channel or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, it must either fit in the third category or none at all.
Predictably, Congress has cited only this third basis as Constitutional authority for the PPACA.
The new law asserts that: “[t]he individual responsibility requirement . . . is commercial and
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce. . . . The requirement regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”
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81.
Contrary to the federal government’s intent, the third category was not meant to afford
Congress a pretextual excuse to regulate any activity that had any effect on commerce, however
trivial.
82.
Significantly, the mandate imposed by the pending bills does not regulate or prohibit the
economic activity of providing or administering health insurance. Nor does it regulate or prohibit
the economic activity of providing health care, whether by doctors, hospitals, pharmaceutical
companies, or other entities engaged in the business of providing a medical good or service. The
health care mandate does not purport to regulate or prohibit activity of any kind, whether
economic or noneconomic. To the contrary, it simply purports to “regulate” inactivity.
Regulating commerce, however, is distinctly different from requiring persons to engage in it.
83.
By its own plain terms, the Individual Mandate provision regulates the absence of action.
To uphold this power under its existing doctrine, the Court must conclude that an individual’s
failure to enter into a contract for health insurance is an activity that is “economic” in nature –
that is, part of a “class of activity” that “substantially affects interstate commerce.”
84.
Never in this nation’s history has the commerce power been used to require a person to
affirmatively engage in economic activity. No decision of the Supreme Court has ever upheld
such a claim of power. Such a regulation of a “class of inactivity” is of a wholly different kind
than any at issue in the Court’s most expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause.
Previous cases have all involved negative prohibitions on private conduct. The affirmative
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Individual Mandate contained in the PPACA is substantially different from a negative
prohibition.
85.
A mandate to enter into a contract with an insurance company would be the first use of
the Commerce Clause to universally mandate an activity by all citizens of the United States. If
such a precedent is established, Congress would have the unlimited power to regulate, prohibit,
or mandate any or all activities in the United States. Such a doctrine would abolish any limit on
federal power and alter the fundamental relationship of then national government to the states
and the people.
86.
By boldly asserting that the authority to regulate interstate commerce includes the power
to regulate not merely voluntary activity that is commercial or even ancillary thereto but
inactivity that is expressly designed to avoid entry into the relevant market, the federal
government advocates a Constitutional doctrine that effectively removes any boundaries to
Congress’s commerce power.
87.
Even in wartime, when the production of material is crucial to national survival,
Congress has never claimed such a power. For example, during World War II, no farmer was
forced to grow food for the troops; no worker was forced to build tanks. While the federal
government encouraged the public to buy its bonds to finance the war effort, it never mandated
they do so. While Congress levied a military draft, it did so as necessary and proper to its
enumerated power in Article I, sec. 8 “to raise and support armies,” not its commerce power.
What Congress did not and cannot do during a wartime emergency, with national survival at
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stake, it cannot do in peacetime simply to avoid the political cost of raising taxes to pay for new
government programs.
88.
While Congress has used its taxing power to fund Social Security and Medicare, never
before has it used its commerce power to mandate that an individual person engage in an
economic transaction with a private company. Using commerce power to regulate the auto
industry is one thing; making everyone purchase an automobile is quite another.
89.
Although it has been argued that Congress has the power to enforce this mandate because
the Constitution empowers the federal government to tax citizens, the particular tax at issue in
this matter is acknowledged in the very text of the legislation to be a “penalty “meant to punish
citizens for their refusal to purchase health insurance from a private company. Properly defined,
a penalty is “[a]n elastic term with many different shades of meaning; it involves [the] idea of
punishment, corporeal or pecuniary, or civil or criminal, although its meaning is generally
confined to pecuniary punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (6th ed. 1990). Central to the
definition of penalty is the “idea of punishment” – “punishment imposed on a wrongdoer . . . in
the form of imprisonment or fine. Though usually for crimes, penalties are also sometimes
imposed for civil wrongs.”Black’s Law Dictionary 1153 (7th ed. 1999). Congress lacks the
power under the Commerce Clause to punish citizens for their refusal to engage in the activity of
purchasing health insurance. Such punishment, meted out by our elected leaders, is an assault
upon the values enshrined in our Constitution.
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90.
Whether Congress describes the payment mechanism contained in the Individual
Mandate a tax or a fine, it cannot so simply circumvent Constitutional proscriptions on its power.
Otherwise, it could evade all Constitutional limits on its authority by merely imposing the
utilization of “taxes” whenever any individual or entity fails to follow a prescribed course of
action. In fact, the Supreme Court has already rejected a similar approach. In Child Labor Tax
Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922),the Court specifically ruled that
Congress could not impose a “tax” in order to penalize conduct – the utilization of child labor –
that it could not regulate under the Commerce Clause. In so doing, the Court recognized, all that
Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great
number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have never parted with, and
which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of
complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To
give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the states.” Drexel, 259 U.S. at
38(emphasis added).
91.
To uphold the constitutionality of a health care Individual Mandate, the Court would have
to find that a decision not to enter into a contract to purchase a good or service was an economic
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. By this reasoning, every
action or inaction could be characterized as “economic,” thereby destroying any limitation on the
commerce power of Congress.
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92.
Because the personal insurance mandate purports to reach the refusal to engage in
economic activity – which is both inactivity and noneconomic – the Court cannot uphold such an
exercise of power without admitting that the Commerce Clause has no limits, a proposition it
rejected in Lopez and Morrison, and from which the Supreme Court did not retreat in Raich. See
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
93.
Although Congress may arguably regulate select aspects of the health care industry or the
health insurance industry in light of their substantial effect on interstate commerce, the PPACA’s
Individual Mandate regulates the noneconomic inactivity of not purchasing a particular service
or entering into a contract. Individuals’ decisions not to enter certain economic transactions have
never before subjected them to the federal regulation of a market that they have chosen not to
enter. The PPACA’s Individual Mandate provision would have the effect of subjecting an
individual’s decisions to federal control by virtue of the fact that the person merely resides
within the borders of the United States.
94.
Not only does the Commerce Clause fail to provide Congress with the authority to
impose the Individual Mandate, the compelled purchase of health insurance also constitutes the
“taking” of private property under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Requiring Petitioners to devote a penalty or a percent of their personal income for a purpose
which they otherwise would not voluntarily choose based on individual circumstances is an
arbitrary and capricious “taking” of property.
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95.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as granting substantive due process rights to American citizens. In this regard, the
Supreme Court has concluded that due process protects against the transgression of personal
immunities that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937); see Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 950 (1980). Without question, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is the right of a
person to be free from purchasing a good or service the individual does not desire to purchase.
96.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court defined those “liberty”
interests protected by the due process clause as follows: “While this court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common-law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
97.
Such liberty interests implicit within the substantive parameters of the due process clause
include the right of an extended family to share a household, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); the right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); the freedom to marry a person of another race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
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1 (1967); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,383 U.S. 663 (1966); the
right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479(1965); the right of access to
the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right to send children to private schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); and the right to have children instructed in foreign language, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
98..
For the purposes of a substantive due process analysis there is no meaningful distinction
between a person who asserts the right to contract or associate with another private entity and a
person who asserts the right not to enter a contract or to associate with another private entity.
Refusal to enter into a contract in the face of an illegitimate demand for a contract is subject to
protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Just as
a person has a First Amendment Constitutional right, in certain circumstances, to be free from
exercising freedom of speech. Petitioners in this matter have the Constitutional right to be free
from entering a private contractor an involuntary association.

99.
Moreover, compelling Petitioners to enter into a private contract to purchase insurance
from another entity will legally require them to share private and personal information with the
contracting party. Specifically, by requiring Petitioners to abide by the PPACA’s Individual
Mandate, Congress is also compelling Petitioners to fully disclose past medical conditions, habits
and behaviors. Not only will the insurer be privy to all past medical information, Congress’s
Individual Mandate will, by necessity, allow the compelled insurer access to Petitioners’ present
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and future medical information of a confidential nature. If judicially enforceable privacy rights
mean anything, then private and confidential medical details certainly merit Constitutional
protection. Petitioners should not be forced to disclose the most intimate details of their past,
present and future medical information.
100.
The PPACA’s Individual Mandate expressly violates Petitioners fundamental rights they
enjoy as part of the “liberty” interest under the Fifth Amendment. Fundamental rights such as
“the right to make one’s own health care decisions,” “the right to abstain from entering into a
contractual relationship with another private entity” and “the right to not be compelled to divulge
private medical information to another private entity” are deeply rooted in American history and
tradition and implicated by the imposition of the PPACA. The new law’s Individual Mandate
represents an abuse of Congressional authority and a clear violation of substantive due process
protections, since Petitioners benefit from a constitutionally protected interest in making certain
kinds of important decisions free from governmental compulsion. The right to privacy judicially
developed pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can be understood only by
considering both the Petitioners’ collective interest and the nature of the federal government’s
interference with it. In short, a judicially recognized right to privacy protects Petitioners from
unduly burdensome interference with their freedom to decide whether to voluntarily purchase
health insurance.
101.
Federalization of “inactivity” imposes a significant threat to the states’ sovereign choices
and individual liberty. Many states have exercised their “sovereign right to adopt in[their] own
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Constitution[s] individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal
Constitution.” See Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
102.
The Court should not devise any new doctrines by which to uphold an individual health
insurance mandate. First and foremost, as already mentioned, to uphold this exercise of power,
the Court would have to affirm for the first time in its history that Congress has a general or
plenary police power, a position expressly rejected by the Constitution and a finding the
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to take.

VII.

COUNT TWO

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
OF UNAPPORTIONED CAPITATION OR DIRECT TAX
103.
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though
fully set forth herein.
104.
The tax penalty on uninsured persons under the PPACA constitutes a capitation and a
direct tax that is not apportioned among the states according to census data, thereby injuring the
sovereign interests of Petitioners.
105.
Said penalty tax applies without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance
and is unrelated to any taxable event or activity. It is to be levied upon persons for their failure or
refusal to do anything other than to exist and reside within the United States. Because the penalty
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tax is not predicated on any actual event, thing, or action, the Individual Mandate represents a
capitation tax that is not properly apportioned per Article I section 9 clause 4.
106.
By its imposition of the penalty tax, the PPACA injures the State of Mississippi’s interest
as a sovereign vested with exclusive authority, except to the extent permitted to the federal
government by the Constitution, to make all taxing decisions affecting its citizens and to confer a
right upon persons in the State to make health care decisions without government interference.
The tax penalty is unconstitutional on its face and cannot be applied constitutionally.

VIII.

COUNT THREE

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP AND
LOSS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE DISCRETION
(Lt107. Gov107. Phil Bryant, in his Individual Capacity)
108.
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though
fully set forth herein.
109.
The State of Mississippi is an employer subject to provisions of the PPACA mandating
that the State provide a health insurance plan to its employees that conforms to the rules provided
in the PPACA and the regulations promulgated there under. Prior to enactment of the PPACA,
the State of Mississippi, as an employer, was free to choose the health insurance plans it offered
to its employees, and employees were free to choose from one or more plans offered by the State
of Mississippi, or to purchase a health insurance plan on the private market that does not
conform to the new federal regulations, or even to not be covered by any health insurance plan at
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all. Pursuant to the PPACA, Congress has chosen to unconstitutionally regulate exactly what
healthcare plans employers like the State of Mississippi must offer and what healthcare plans that
its employees must accept.
110.
Employees of the State of Mississippi will be forced by Congress to purchase health
insurance either from their employer or in the private market, with similar penalties for
noncompliance as discussed supra. Consequently, State employees are directly affected and
commandeered by the PPACA, since the law necessarily substitutes the judgment of Congress
and the Executive branches of the federal government for that of the employees and their
employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition of health insurance plans that
may be offered to and accepted or rejected by employees.
111.
State employees will clearly suffer a deprivation of liberty, in that they may no longer
exercise the discretion to choose a healthcare plan that does not conform to the PPACA’s
mandates either from their employer or on the open market. Congress has therefore chosen to
regulate personal decisions in a way that deprives employees of a liberty interest and that
exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Such an approach amounts to an
unconstitutional commandeering of State government.
112.
The PPACA will convert what previously had been a voluntary federal-state partnership
into a compulsory top-down federal program in which the discretion of the Petitioner Bryant, the
State of Mississippi and its government employees is removed, in derogation of the core
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constitutional principle of federalism upon which the Republic was founded. In so doing, the
PPACA exceeds the powers of Congress and violates the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
113.
Petitioner Bryant, as Mississippi’s Lieutenant Governor, is an employee of the State of
Mississippi who brings this cause of action in his individual capacity as a private citizen and an
employee rather than as an elected official of the State of Mississippi. As government employee,
Petitioner Bryant is directly injured by the PPACA’s mandate that the State of Mississippi offer
health insurance plans to its employees that conform solely to the judgment of the federal
government of the United States, heedless of the desires of the employer or employees. He is
further injured by the enactment of the Individual Mandate, because he now cannot choose to
drop the federally mandated plan that his employer must offer in favor of non-insurance without
incurring penalties imposed by Congress.
IX.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS
114.

First, Petitioners bring this action as individuals and as a statewide class action pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Petitioners’ petition, which alleges class-wide unconstitutional activity is
particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a single
proof and subject to a single injunctive. Petitioners qualify for an Injunctive and Declaratory
Class Under Rule 23(b)(2)on behalf of a class defined as follows:
(a)

All persons in Mississippi who fall within the purview of the PPACA and who

therefore will be required, as part of the law’s Individual Mandate, to purchase health insurance;
(b)

All persons in Mississippi who will be prosecuted or otherwise penalized frothier

inactivity and/or refusal enter into a contract for the purchase of health insurance as mandated by
the PPACA;
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The class excludes all persons who, at the time this Complaint is filed, do not fall

under the purview of the PPACA or who have already instituted individual litigation in
Mississippi seeking similar relief against Defendants on the basis of the circumstances described
in the above-referenced paragraphs.
Second, Petitioners seek to establish a class or sub-class encompassing governmental
employees of the State of Mississippi. Specifically, Petitioner Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his
individual capacity, brings an individual action and a statewide class or sub-class action pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. His claims allege class-wide unconstitutional activity on behalf of all
Mississippi state employees and is particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the
common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to a single injunctive. Petitioner
Bryant’s class or sub-class would represent a request for Injunctive and Declaratory relief on
behalf of a class or sub-class defined as follows:
(a)

All government employees of the State of Mississippi who fall within the purview

of the PPACA and who currently possess healthcare insurance as part of their employment with
the State.
(b)

All government employees of the State of Mississippi who will be adversely

affected by the PPACA’s implementation.
(c)

This class or sub-class excludes all persons who, at the time this Complaint

misfiled, do not fall under the purview of the PPACA or who have already instituted individual
litigation in Mississippi seeking similar relief against Defendants on the basis of the
circumstances described in the above-referenced paragraphs.
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115.
Those persons excluded from the class by subparagraphs (c) of paragraph 97, supra may
opt into the class at any time, but not later than ten (10) days prior to the final hearing regarding
injunctive issues against Defendants. Exercise of this opt-in right will require some affirmative
act by the person or an attorney of the person, such as by filling out and mailing an opt-in notice
listing by name all persons who wish to opt into the class. All persons who are excluded from the
class by subparagraphs (c) or paragraph 97, supra, who do not affirmatively opt into the class by
the specified date will not be bound by the class.
116.
Petitioners are members of the class they seek to represent. Moreover, Petitioners’
interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other class members. Petitioners’
claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, and Petitioners will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
117.
Specifically, and without limitation, the following questions of law and fact are common
to all class members: whether Defendants have the Constitutional authority to mandate class
members to purchase health insurance and incur health insurance premiums, or in the alternative,
to subject class members to a monetary penalty. As to Petitioner Bryant’s class or sub class,
without limitation, the following questions of law and fact are common to all class or sub-class
members: whether Defendants have the Constitutional authority to substitute the judgment of
Congress and the Executive branches of the federal government for that of another government’s
employees and their employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition of health
insurance plans that may be offered to and voluntarily accepted or rejected by employees.
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118.
The claims of the representative Petitioners named herein are typical of the claims of the
class.
119.
The Petitioner class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
120.
Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members will create the risk of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members which would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants and would also, as a practical
matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications, or which
would substantially impair or impede such members’ abilities to protect their interests.
121.
Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate relief with respect to the class as a whole.
122.
The questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate over questions
affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
123.
Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not “opt-out” classes and notice is not mandatory in such cases.
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COUNT FOUR

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
124.
Petitioners realize, adopt, and incorporate by reference all prior paragraphs as though
fully set forth herein. There is an actual controversy of sufficient immediacy and concreteness
relating to the legal rights and duties of the Petitioners and their legal relations with the
Defendants to warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201.
125.
The harm to the Petitioners as a direct result of the PPACA is sufficiently real and
imminent to warrant the issuance of a conclusive declaratory judgment clarifying the legal
relations of the parties.
XI.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
126.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Petitioners, including the
Petitioner class, are entitled to the following relief:
(a)

Injunctive relief as this Court deems appropriate to declare unconstitutional and

therefore eliminate the PPACA’s Individual Mandate that persons enter into a private contract to
purchase healthcare insurance;
(b)

A declaration of Petitioners’ rights, duties and obligations under the PPACA;

specifically, as to whether Petitioners must purchase healthcare insurance or be required by the
federal government to pay a monetary or criminal penalty;
(c)

Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to Petitioners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2412 or

any other applicable statutory provision;
(d)

Such other and further relief as this court deems appropriate; and
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Interest and costs of this action, including costs of notice to class members, if

required, and all related expenses of processing class members’ claims.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request this Court to grant the relief requested in
the preceding paragraphs.
Respectfully submitted on Friday, March 04, 2011.
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, RYAN S. WALTERS,
MICHAEL E.SHOTWELL AND RICHARD A.
CONRAD, ONBEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
LEE LAW FIRM, LLC
BY:
K. Douglas Lee, MB No. 9887
22 Milbranch Road No. 100
Hattiesburg MS 39401
Voice: (601) 583-4447
Fax: (601) 450-0152
kdl@leelaw.us
Attorney for Plaintiffs
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON
& McDANIEL, PLLC

BY:

/s/ Christopher B. McDaniel
Christopher B. McDaniel, MB No. 10711
Brett W. Robinson, MB #10006
Roy A. Nowell, Jr., MB #100768
Post Office Drawer 1409
Laurel, Ms 39441
Phone: (601) 649-8611
Fax: (601) 649-6979
cmdaniel@hortmanharlow.com
brobinson@hortmanharlow.com
rnowell@hortmanharlow.com
Attorneys For Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served using the
Court’s ECF system, on Friday, March 04, 2011 to the counsel of record for all Defendants
Dated Friday, March 04, 2011.
By: /s/ Christopher B. McDaniel
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee
K. DOUGLAS LEE
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